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Introduction
Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA)1 states 
that:  
A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may 
not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, 
if  a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of 
being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Con-
tracting Party.
Although the ne bis in idem principle expressed in this provision has already been the 
subject of many rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union2 it still raises 
many doubts among academics and practitioners. In the judgments C-129/14 PPU Spa-
sic3 and C-398/12 M.4, the CJEU settled significant issues for the judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters pertaining to the interpretation of Art. 54 of the CISA. 
In the Spasic case, the CJEU ruled whether enforcement clause provided for in Ar-
ticle 54 of the CISA contradicts the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union5, which also states the principle of ne bis in idem but does not make its application 
subject to the condition of execution of the sentence. Second, in the judgment C-398/12 
1 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Govern-
ments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks and their common borders, 22.09.2000, OJ 
L 239/19. Hereinafter: CISA.
2 Hereinafter: CJEU.
3 EU:C:2014:586.
4 EU:C:2014:1057.
5 Hereinafter: Charter.
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M., the CJEU ruled on several doubts regarding the interpretation and scope of the term 
“finally disposed” contained in Art. 54 of the CISA. The reasoning of the CJEU in these 
two cases differs significantly, which might be surprising given the fact that the issuing 
dates of these two judgments are separated by only a few days.
The principle of ne bis in idem is well-established regulation in both domestic and in-
ternational law6. The issue of a prohibition of recurring criminal proceedings in the same 
case and against the same person has been included in the various instruments of interna-
tional criminal law, including conventions adopted within the Council of Europe, among 
which the Conventions of 19707 and of 19728 deserve special attention. In the Europe-
an Union9,the ne bis in idem principle was expressed at first in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation, before the Treaty of Mastricht. entered into force of the, the Mem-
ber States - then - the European Community, adopted on 27 May 1987 the Convention 
on double punishment. Due to the lack of enough ratifications, this Convention has never 
entered into force. However, it turned out to be important for further development of 
the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Its provisions were included in Art. 54–58 
of the CISA and are currently applicable to the majority of the EU Member States. In 
addition, the principle is included in the number of instruments based on the principle of 
mutual recognition and, as already mentioned at the outset, in the Charter. 
Enforcement Clause. Spasic Case C-129/14 PPU 
In accordance with Art. 50 of the Charter: “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law”.
In the Charter, therefore, the prohibition of re-judging is not dependent on the condi-
tion envisaged in the CISA, i.e. that “the penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, 
is actually in the process of being enforced”. When trying to explain the differences in 
the burden of these provisions, it should be noted that the CISA, signed in 1985, was 
primarily aimed at abolishing checks at common borders, including the abolition of 
checks in relation to the movement of persons and not fostering judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters. At that time, the idea of a  common area of justice, was not yet 
expressed in the treaties. The CISA was incorporated into the EU legal order under 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 54 of the CISA has for the first time successfully in-
6 With regard to the definition of the principle see: A. Sakowicz, Zasada ne bis in idem w prawie 
karnym w ujęciu paneuropejskim, Białystok 2011.
7 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.
8 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.
9 Hereinafter: EU.
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troduced the principle of the prohibition of double punishment, which is applicable in 
a situation involving criminal proceedings in the two states. Other regulations narrowed 
the scope of the ne bis in idem principle to domestic matters only. An example of such 
a regulation is contained in the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
of 22 November 1984.10
 Against the background of the numerous judgments of the CJEU regarding the 
principle of ne bis in idem11, it could be foreseen that it is only a matter of time when 
the CJEU will decide on the mutual relationship between the provisions of the CISA 
and the Charter. Ultimately, this was the subject matter of a request for a preliminary 
ruling from the German court in the case C-129/14 Zoran Spasic. Since the accused 
was in custody, the case was dealt with in the urgent preliminary ruling procedure12. The 
CJEU issued the verdict quickly, even though the case concerned a very complicated 
matter. Perhaps the pressure of time influenced somehow the analysis made by the Court 
and its argumentation, which is not fully convincing in this matter.
Z. Spasic, a citizen of Serbia13, was accused of fraud committed to the detriment of 
a German citizen. The offense was committed in Milan in 2009. Based on a  verdict 
issued in Italy, Z. Spasic was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 800 
euros. At that time, Z. Spasic was in Austria, where he had served a prison sentence for 
another offense. For these reasons he paid a fine but was not able to serve the imprison-
ment sentence for the fraud committed in Italy. Since the crime in Milan was committed 
against a German citizen, the criminal proceedings were also initiated simultaneously 
by the German authorities. Under the European arrest warrant issued by the German 
authorities, Austria transferred Z. Spasic to Germany. As a result, he was in Germany 
waiting for a trial whose object was a crime for which Z. Spasic had already been con-
victed in Italy. 
In the course of the trial in Germany, the accused referred to the ne bis in idem prin-
ciple expressed in Art. 50 of the Charter demanding the discontinuance of proceedings. 
Due to the mentioned differences in the concept of the ne bis in idem principle in vari-
ous legal instruments, the Higher Regional Court in Nuremberg referred the question 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, which was intended to clarify the following issue: 
10 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
11 Eg.: C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2003:87; C-469/03, Miraglia, 
EU:C:2005:156; C-436/04, Van Esebroeck, EU:C:2006:165; C-467/04, Gasparini and others, 
EU:C:2006:610; C-150/05, van Straaten, EU:C:2006:614; C-288/05, Kretzinger, EU:C:2007:441; 
C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, EU:C:2007:444; C-297/07, Bourquain, EU:C:2008:708; C-491/07, 
Turansky, EU:C:2008:768.
12 Hereinafter: PPU.
13 Article 54 of the CISA applies to third-country nationals; Cf. for example, Judgment of the 
CJEU in joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, § 9.
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“Is Article 54 CISA compatible with Article 50 of the Charter, in so far as it subjects the 
application of the ne bis in idem principle to the condition that, if a penalty has been im-
posed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer 
be enforced under the laws of the sentencing State?”
The court found that the “enforcement clause” is compatible with the Charter. The 
CJEU came to this conclusion after analysing the provision of Art. 52(1) of the Char-
ter, which sets the rules for admissibility of restrictions of rights and freedoms. This 
provision provides that all such limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. The CJEU pointed out that enforcement 
clause is to be seen in that context since it is intended to prevent, in the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice, the impunity of persons definitively convicted and sentenced 
in the EU Member State.14 According to the CJEU,  it cannot be contested that the 
execution condition laid down in Article 54 of the CISA is appropriate. By allowing, in 
cases of non-execution of the sentence imposed, the authorities of one Member State 
to prosecute a person definitively convicted and sentenced by another Member State on 
the basis of the same acts, the risk that the person concerned would enjoy impunity by 
virtue of his leaving the territory of the State in which he was sentenced is avoided.15 
The CJEU did not agree with the arguments presented, among others by the European 
Commission, that the numerous instruments of secondary law based on the principle of 
mutual recognition at least in a large number of cases can eliminate the risk of impunity. 
Such instruments – in opinion of the CJEU – are not capable of fully achieving the 
objective pursued since the existing instruments provided for in the Framework Deci-
sions and the Directives are not perfect enough to guarantee the avoiding of impunity 
in case where the person concerned would leave the territory of the State in which he 
was sentenced. In this context – according to the CJEU – the obligation to take direct 
consultations between Member States on any effective solution aimed at avoiding the 
negative consequences of parallel proceedings, provided in framework decision on pre-
venting the conflicts of jurisdiction16 is also insufficient. With regard to the obligation 
of mutual support envisaged in Article 4(3)17 of the Treaty on the European Union, the 
CJEU stated that one cannot exclude that the Member States can contact each other 
and initiate consultations in order to verify whether the Member State which imposed 
14 Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-129/14 PPU, § 63.
15 Judgment of the CJEU in the Case C-129/14 PPU, § 64.
16 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settle-
ment of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings OJ L 328, 15.12.2009.
17 In accordance with art. 4 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union: “Pursuant to the principle of 
sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties”.
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the first sentence really intends to execute the penalties imposed.18 In the opinion of the 
CJEU, however, it does not change the fact that the enforcement condition provided 
for  in the CISA is necessary and proportionate and therefore justified in the light of 
the provision of Article 52 (1) of the Charter. 
View of Advocate General Jääskinen
Advocate General19 N.  Jääskinen assessed the case differently. In his view20, the emer-
gence of a more effective system of cooperation in criminal law matters cannot in itself 
affect the interpretation of the enforcement clause laid down in Article 54 CISA, however, 
that development must have some bearing on assessment of its compatibility with Ar-
ticle 50 of the Charter. In the opinion of the AG it is questionable whether the enforce-
ment clause in CISA is “still needed in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, where 
cross-border enforcement now takes place through the mutual recognition instruments”21.
In the view, the AG compares the provisions of the Charter to Art. 4 of Protocol 7 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights22, which also establishes the ne bis in idem 
principle. The AG rightly points out that the wording of the provisions is identical, with 
the difference that application of Art. 4 of Protocol 7 of ECTHR is limited to domestic 
issues only. As an exception to the principle ne bis in idem Art. 4 par. 2 of Protocol 7 to 
the ECHR allows reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure 
of the State concerned if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there 
has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the out-
come of the case. Although Protocol 7 to the ECTHR has not been ratified by all the 
European Union Member States, the AG believes that there is no doubt that Art. 50 
of the Charter should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the ECTHR 
and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights23.24 This opinion 
is supported also by the position of the CJEU reflected in the case C617/10 Åkerberg 
18 Judgment of the CJEU in the case C-129/14 PPU, § 63.
19 Hereinafter: ECTHR.
20 View of AG Jääskinen in the case C-129/14 PPU.
21 Ibidem, § 52.
22 Hereinafter: AG.
23 Hereinafter: ECHR.
24 AG claims that the fact that some Member States have not ratified Protocol No  7 cannot 
have any bearing on the interpretation of Article 50 of the Charter, since it does not change 
the scope of that provision. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to granting the Mem-
ber States a unilateral power of interpretation as regards the substance of the European Union’s 
system of fundamental rights. In view of the principle of the autonomy of EU law, in conjunc-
tion with the CJEU’s task of ensuring its uniform interpretation, such a conclusion must be 
excluded.
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Fransson.25 The analysis of the provisions of both the Charter and the CISA in the light 
of the ECTHR leads the AG to the following conclusion: ‘It is undisputed that the 
execution condition (enforcement clause) laid down in Article 54 of the CISA makes 
the application of the ne bis in idem principle subject to additional conditions which are 
not present in Article 50 of the Charter and which do not correspond to the derogations 
allowed under Article 4(2) of Protocol 7’.26 In other words, the enforcement clause is 
a derogation which does not coincide with the exceptions provided for in Protocol 7 to 
the ECTHR. In the most important part of the view, the AG points out that the Euro-
pean Union law now offers legal instruments that allow the Member States to enforce 
criminal sanctions in cases where the convicted person is in another Member State, as 
well as the exchange of relevant information to avoid impunity.27
The AG also notes that a number of secondary legislation in the field of cooperation 
in criminal matters refers to the ne bis in idem principle, which is not subject to a condi-
tion of enforcement of penalty.28 For these reasons, in the opinion of the AG, systemati-
cally subjecting persons who have already been finally convicted and sentenced in one 
Member State to a  risk of further prosecution in another Member State exceeds the 
limits of what is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pur-
sued.29 The AG also pointed to the fact that the Member States are obliged not only to 
interpret, but also to apply the secondary legislation (and thus also the CISA) in accor-
dance with fundamental rights. That obligation may entail a duty not to apply the given 
instrument (its provisions).30 In the final part of the view, the AG concludes that for all 
the above reasons, the enforcement condition of the CISA in the general application 
does not meet the proportionality test.
In the AG’s opinion, only in three cases the application of the enforcement clause 
must be considered necessary: the first exception concerns situations that fall within 
the  scope of Article 4(2) of Protocol No 7, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (cases where reopening of the case is allowed). The second exception 
concerns the perpetrators of crimes which the Member States are required to punish 
under general rules of international law, such as crimes against humanity, genocide and 
25 EU: C:2013:280.
26 View of AG Jääskinen in the Case C-129/14 PPU, § 63.
27 Eg. Framework decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European 
Union or Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions 
in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings.
28 View of AG Jääskinen in the Case C-129/14 PPU, § 93–100.
29 Ibidem, § 101.
30 In this regard, the AG refers to the judgment of the CJEU of 21.12.2011 in the Joined Cases 
C-411/10 and 493/10 N.S. and others - EU:C:2011:865.
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war crimes. The third situation pertains to the event of a lasting obstacle to cooperation 
as regards the execution of judgments; such an obstacle must exist despite the applica-
tion of the less intrusive instruments available to the Member States. 
Assessment of the Ruling of the CJEU in Spasic case
It is worth pointing out that the analysis of the enforcement clause contained in Art. 54 
of the CISA was already carried out by the CJEU in the judgment of 18 July 2007 
(Kretzinger case).31 In both judgments, i.e. Spasic and Kretzinger, the CJEU has indicated 
that the purpose of the enforcement clause is to avoid a  situation in which a person 
whose trial has been finally disposed of in the first State can no longer be prosecuted 
for the same acts and therefore ultimately remains unpunished if the State in which the 
sentence had first been passed did not enforce the sentence imposed.32
It is doubtful if there was a real risk of impunity in the Spasic case. The CJEU analyzes 
the risk of impunity in the event the perpetrator leaves the territory of the convicting 
state before the sentence is enforced. In the discussed case, however, it seems that such 
a risk did not exist.
Z. Spasic was under arrest in Austria. There were no circumstances indicating that the 
Italian authorities would not take necessary actions in due time to enforce the previously 
imposed penalty. Secondly, the CJEU categorically accepted that continuing prosecution 
in the same case in another state would automatically allow avoiding the risk of impunity. 
However, the mere fact of continuing the prosecution or opening separate proceedings in 
another Member State does not guarantee that the punishment will be enforced. While it 
may be argued that parallel proceedings will limit such a risk, there may still be certain cir-
cumstances (in the Member State that is taking the case for the second time), which cause 
that the punishment will never be imposed. The CJEU’s argument on the relationship 
between the enforcement clause and the avoidance of penalty cannot be accepted uncriti-
cally, although prima facie it may seem persuasive. One cannot exclude that the second 
proceedings will end with the discontinuation of the proceedings or with the acquittal33. 
In that case, the conflicting decisions of national courts would create additional difficul-
ties in the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This would certainly have a negative 
impact on the level of mutual trust between Member States. The inevitability of punish-
ment is not the only important aspect in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The 
second proceedings cause to offender - a additional costs and negative mental experiences 
31 EU:C:2007:441.
32 Judgment of the CJEU in Case C288/05, § 51.
33 Cf. M. Wasmeier, Ne bis in idem and the enforcement condition. Balancing Freedom, Security and 
Justice? “New Journal of European Criminal Law” 2014, no. 4.
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associated with the uncertainty of his situation. The CJEU’s reasoning focuses entirely 
on the need to avoid impunity and omits other important aspects such as legal certainty. 
Also, the remaining arguments of the CJEU regarding the interpretation of the enforce-
ment condition in the context of Art. 52(1) of the Character are not completely accurate. 
In the opinion of the CJEU, due to the fact that the existing instruments of mutual assis-
tance are not conditional on fulfilling the condition analogous to the enforcement condi-
tion, they cannot ensure that the set objective (i.e. avoidance of impunity) is fully achieved. 
Unfortunately, the CJEU did not consider the more balanced position (supported by the 
European Commission), which implies the obligation to use all available instruments of 
cooperation in the EU before initiating the second criminal proceedings against the same 
person. This position assumes that a possible re-initiation of criminal proceedings would 
be possible only if all available forms of cooperation have failed. M. Wasmeier has rightly 
observed that the analysis of the existing cooperation instruments made by the CJEU was 
not complete34. For example, there was no reference to the coordination and mediation 
provided by Eurojust, which in this case was not only an option but an obligation of the 
judicial authorities. According to the framework decision on the prevention of conflicts 
of jurisdiction35 the competent authorities of the Member States are required to enter into 
direct consultations with a view to reaching an agreement on an effective solution that will 
allow avoiding negative effects of parallel proceedings. This obligation may also be inter-
preted from Article 57 of the CISA36. 
The considerations of the CJEU in the Spasic case are not profound. The ruling was 
issued without the careful examination of all aspects and consequences of applica-
tion of the enforcement condition.
Final Disposal of the Judgment
Surprisingly, in other judgments referring to the interpretation of the provision of 
Art. 54 of the CISA, the CJEU presented a different course of reasoning. In the judg-
ment of joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 - H. Gözütok and K. Brügge37, the CJEU 
34 Ibidem, p. 542.
35 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009.
36 In accordance with art. 57 of the CISA: ‘Where a Contracting Party charges a person with an 
offence and the competent authorities of that Contracting Party have reason to believe that 
the charge relates to the same acts as those in respect of which the person’s trial has been fi-
nally disposed of in another Contracting Party, those authorities shall, if they deem it necessary, 
request the relevant information from the competent authorities of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory judgment has already been delivered’.
37 EU:C: 2003:87.
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emphasized the freedom and justice aspects, whereas concerns of impunity seemed to 
receive not as much attention38. The CJEU emphasized that the purpose of Art. 54 of 
the CISA is to ensure the exercise of the right to free movement in the Schengen Area 
and that the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the CISA implies that the 
Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them 
recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome 
would be different if its own national law were applied39. Likewise in the case C-150/05 
Van Straaten40, when answering the question whether the principle ne bis in idem ap-
plies to judgments, as a result of which the accused is acquitted due to lack of sufficient 
evidence, the CJEU stated that ‘in the case of a final acquittal for lack of evidence, the 
bringing of criminal proceedings in another Contracting State for the same acts would 
undermine the principles of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions’.41 The interpretation given by the CJEU in these judgments supports the protective 
nature of the regulation of Art. 54 of the CISA. While interpreting this provision, the 
CJEU seemed to emphasize that it is intended to counteract the unlimited and unjusti-
fied right of punishment (ius puniendi) of the Member States in the area of freedom, 
security and justice.42 The above-mentioned rulings were issued in 2006 and 2013. 
Has the CJEU therefore changed its position regarding Art. 54 of the CISA since then 
and it has lost faith in the means of mutual recognition? Against such argumenta-
tion speaks reasoning presented in the case C-398/12 M.43 ). This case also concerned the 
interpretation of Art. 54 of the CISA.
 In relation to M., an Italian citizen living in Belgium, criminal proceedings were 
conducted due to allegations on crimes committed against sexual freedom of a minor. 
As a result of preparatory proceedings, in the course of which various evidences had been 
collected and examined, the court of first instance (the court supervising the preparatory 
proceedings) discontinued the proceedings and did not refer the case to the court ruling 
on criminal liability due to insufficient evidence. This decision was also upheld by the 
higher court after the appeal. At the same time, criminal proceedings in a case involving 
the same acts were initiated in Italy. In this case M. referred to the ne bis in idem princi-
ple, indicating that the proceedings for the same acts had already been validly concluded 
in Belgium. In consequence, there was doubt if a final judgment that terminates criminal 
proceedings after an investigation, but which permits the proceedings to be reopened in 
38 Cf. B. Nita – Światłowska, Prawomocność orzeczenia jako element wyznaczający zakres zasady ne 
bis in idem w art. 54 Konwencji z Schengen, „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy”2014, no.5, p.30.
39 Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-187/01 and C-385/01, §33.
40 EU:C: 2006:614.
41 Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-150/05, § 59.
42 M.  Wasmeier, The principle of ne bis in idem, “Revue Internationale de Droit Penal” 2006, 
no. 1–2, pp. 121–130.
43 EU:C: 2014:1057.
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the light of new evidence, preclude the initiation or conduct of proceedings in respect 
of the same facts and the same person in another Member States. The CJEU answered 
the question in the affirmative. Its arguments resemble those which were previously pre-
sented in the cases of Gözütok/Brügge and Van Straaten presented above.
In the first place, the CJEU recalled that in order to determine if a judicial decision 
constitutes a ‘final’ judgment44 in the meaning of Art 54 of the CISA, it must be ensured 
that that decision was issued following the assessment of the merits of the case.45 The 
aptness of that interpretation of Article 54 of the CISA is borne out by the fact that 
it is the only interpretation to give precedence to the object and purpose of the provi-
sion rather than to procedural or purely formal matters. In the M. case the decision on 
discontinuance of proceedings was made at the end of an investigation during which 
various items of evidence were collected and examined. Therefore, in the opinion of the 
court, the decision met the condition of assessment of the merits of the case.
In a further part of the judgment, the CJEU stated that the possibility of reopening 
the criminal investigation if new facts and/or evidence become available, cannot af-
fect the final nature of the order of the national court.46 In this regard, the CJEU indicat-
ed that Art. 54 of the CISA should be interpreted in the light of Art. 50 of the Charter 
and as a consequence47 also in the light of Art. 4(2) Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR. These 
provisions provide that the principle ne bis in idem does not preclude the possibility 
of resuming the proceedings if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts. It 
his respect, it was held in the judgment of the ECHR in Sergey Zolutukhin v. Russia,48 
that Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR ‘becomes relevant on commencement of 
a new prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction has already acquired the force 
of res judicata.’ On the other hand, extraordinary remedies are not taken into account for 
the purposes of determining whether the proceedings have reached a final conclusion. 
Moreover, the CJEU stressed that ‘in view of the need to verify that the evidence 
relied on to justify the reopening of the proceedings is indeed new, any new proceed-
ings, based on such a possibility of reopening, against the same person for the same acts 
can be brought only in the Contracting State in which that order was made’.49 In con-
44 With regard to the condition of ‘final disposal’ of the case see also: B. Nita – Światłowska, 
Prawomocność orzeczenia…, op.cit. ;B.  Nita, Artykuł 54 konwencji wykonawczej z  Schengen 
w  wyrokach Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z  28 września 2006 r.: C-467/04, 
postępowanie karne przeciwko Giuseppe Francesco Gasparini i  innym oraz C-150/05, Jean 
Leon Van Straaten przeciwko Niderlandom i Republice Włoskiej, „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 
2007, no. 9, pp. 44–52; A. Sołtysińska, Zasada ne bis in idem z art. 54 konwencji wykonawczej 
z Schengen, „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2007, no. 12.
45 Judgment of the CJEU in the Case C469/03 - Filomeno Mario Miraglia; EU:C:2005:156.
46 Judgment of the CJEU in Case C469/03, § 40.
47 Cf. Judgment of the CJEU in the Case C617/10.
48 Sergey Zolutukhin v. Russia, no. 14939/03, § 83, ECHR 2009.
49 Judgment of the CJEU in the Case C398/12, § 40.
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clusion, the CJEU held that order finding that there is no ground to refer a  case to 
a trial court which precludes, the bringing of new criminal proceedings in respect of the 
same acts against the person to whom that finding applies, unless new facts and/or evi-
dence against that person come to light, must be considered to be a final judgment, for 
the purposes of the Article 54 of the CISA.
In this case, the CJEU in its reasoning did not refer to arguments related to broad-
ly understood security or impunity, although the subject matter of the case at first 
glance seemed at least as sensitive as in the case of Spasic. It also stressed the impact of 
the Charter on the interpretation of rules set in the CISA.
Conclusions
Regarding the Spasic case, it is difficult to see the need for additional criminal proceed-
ings in the absence of a real threat that the penalty will not be enforced. It is regrettable 
that the CJEU has not thoroughly analysed all the existing advanced possibilities of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, which allow minimizing the risk 
of impunity to the extreme and rare cases. The consequences for the accused related 
to parallel proceedings are severe. In this context, the position of the AG, according to 
which the initiation of another criminal case in another Member State is possible only 
in three exceptional cases, is more convincing and balanced. Permission granted by the 
CJEU to unlimited application of the enforcement clause with omission of the second-
ary law instruments and wording of Art. 50 of the Charter is an extreme position. It may 
also be surprising that in the Spasic case, the CJEU as the only criterion accepted the 
necessity of preventing impunity without considering other important aspects including 
legal certainty. 
The reasoning in the Spasic case is in contradiction with the judgment in the M. case, 
issued just a few days later. In the latter, the CJEU underlined that a Member State must 
comply with a final decision that has already been passed in another Member State, even 
when the outcome of the case would be different if its own national law were applied.
 The ruling of the CJEU in the M. case seems to share the arguments of the previous 
judgments in the Gözütok/Brügge cases, where the primacy was given to the freedom of 
movement and legal certainty. Differences in the adopted legal hierarchy and the way in 
which decisions in the Spasic and M. cases are justified might be surprising given that 
the judgments were issued in the same period. Such a contradict ruling is detrimental for 
the creation of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
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summary
Interpretation of Art. 54 of the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement
The paper discusses the problem of the ne bis in idem principle stipulated in the Conven-
tion Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Article 54 of the CISA makes the application of the 
principle ne bis in idem subject to the condition of execution of the penalty. An analogous 
condition is not provided for in the Charter. These differences caused doubts regarding 
the application of the ne bis in idem principle and were subject of the question for pre-
liminary ruling in the Spasic case (C-129/14 PPU). The paper contains a critical review of 
the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this judgment. In addi-
tion, the article also contains an analysis of the CJEU’s decision in Case C-398/12 M. in 
which the CJEU has analysed the meaning of “final disposal” of the judgment in the 
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context of the ne bis in idem principle. Based on the above judgments, the article presents 
arguments indicating that the reasoning of the CJEU on the conditions for the applica-
tion of the ne bis in idem principle in judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU 
is not consistent.
Keywords: European criminal law; Area of Freedom; Security and Justice; ne bis in idem 
principle; mutual trust; mutual recognition.
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